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⚖️ Delhi High Court Clarifies Distinction Between ‘Interlocutory’ and ‘Intermediate’ Orders Under CrPC – Key for Understanding Revisional Jurisdiction

 In a noteworthy decision, the Delhi High Court has elaborated on the often misunderstood difference between interlocutory and intermediate orders, a distinction central to the maintainability of revision petitions under Section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).

🧑‍⚖️ Case Title: Dilshad Hussain v. Pushpa Devi
📌 Court: Delhi High Court


🔍 Key Judicial Observation:

“A judicial order passed by a criminal court can be either a Final Order, Intermediate Order, or Interlocutory Order. While there is no ambiguity in identifying final orders such as discharge, acquittal, or conviction, the real challenge lies in distinguishing between interlocutory and intermediate orders. This distinction is crucial in analyzing the statutory bar under Section 397(2) CrPC, which limits the revisional powers of the High Court and Sessions Court.”


📘 What Do These Terms Mean?

Final Orders

  • Terminate criminal proceedings completely.

  • Examples: Conviction, acquittal, or discharge.

Interlocutory Orders

  • Passed during the course of proceedings.

  • Do not substantially affect the rights of the parties.

  • Revision is barred under Section 397(2) CrPC.

Intermediate Orders

  • Not final, but substantially affect the rights of the accused or prosecution.

  • Passed at an intermediate stage but are not purely procedural.

  • Revisional jurisdiction is maintainable despite not being a final order.

🔍 Example of an intermediate order: An order rejecting an application to summon additional accused or denying access to crucial evidence — these don’t end the case, but significantly impact its outcome.


⚖️ Legal Significance

The Court has clarified that Section 397(2) CrPC bars revision only against purely interlocutory orders, and not against intermediate orders that decide vital issues in the case.

This interpretation is in line with prior Supreme Court rulings such as:

  • Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977)

  • Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1977)


🧠 Why This Matters

✅ Helps advocates and litigants understand whether a revision petition is maintainable
✅ Prevents misuse of interlocutory bar to shield substantive procedural errors
✅ Reinforces the Court’s role in ensuring just outcomes at all stages of criminal trials


🔖 Final Thought

Not every order passed during trial is “interlocutory.” When a decision affects core rights or strategies, courts must be allowed to exercise revisional powers — and this ruling ensures that door remains open.

This clarity from the Delhi High Court provides valuable guidance to both practitioners and trial courts, ensuring precision in procedural law and fair access to remedies.

#DelhiHighCourt #CriminalProcedure #CrPC #InterlocutoryOrder #IntermediateOrder #RevisionPetition #Section397 #LegalUpdate #IndianJudiciary #DueProcess #JudicialReview #LawPractice

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